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Abstract 
 
This paper is an empirical analysis of the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
institutional quality and the size of a government on venture capital (VC) activity. We 
conclude that institutional quality, the FDI and public spending have definitive importance 
as elements for the development of a public policy that increases the quantity and quality of 
venture capital fund (VCF) investment. Higher institutional quality, higher FDI and lower 
public spending allow the VCF investment volume to grow. The FDI shows higher level of 
significance in promoting investment in high-tech companies and institutional quality 
increases the productivity of FDI investment in the generation of  VCF. Government 
spending dramatically and adversely affects the activity of VCF and institutional quality 
increases the negative effect of government spending on the activity of VCF in emerging 
countries. This last result suggests that the higher the institutional quality of a country, the 
less state intervention it requires to promote investment of VCF. The results are consistent 
with the hypothesis of the FDI spillover and crowding out of public spending. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature acknowledges that the financing of venture capital funds (VCFs) is vital for 
the creation of new companies (Black and Gilson: 1998, Hellmann and Puri: 2000, 2002, 
Kortum and Lerner 2000). Companies in early development stages and the ones operating 
in high-tech industries, benefit from funding of VCF because they have greater knowledge, 
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higher willingness to participate in development of financing companies and a greater risk 
tolerance. (Gompers, 1995; Grabielsson and Huse: 2002; Hsu: 2004). 
Emerging countries have tried to follow the example of the most developed
1
  by adopting 
measures to promote the development of venture capital investment. Nevertheless, there’s a 
lack of empirical studies necessary to validate the effectiveness of these policies. Very little 
is known about how to encourage the creation of active VC markets in emerging countries. 
 One of the purposes of this paper is to help fill this void through the empirical analysis of 
the relationship between foreign investment, institutional quality and size of government 
with VC activity. It is argued that these instruments are of great importance in the definition 
of a public policy which seeks the development of VC markets and recommendations 
regarding their use are presented to promote the growth of VCF investments in emerging 
countries. 
A study of panel data with a new database is made. The VCR investment registration from 
the Thomson one's Private Equity / Venture Capital database is used to build a database 
with a larger time period than the one used in these type of studies for emerging countries 
(historical data of fifteen years, 1996-2010) and with a greater number of emerging 
countries (forty-three countries classified as emerging economies in the Financial Times 
and the London Stock Exchange: FTSE index) 
The results indicate that the effect of institutional quality is definitive for the VCF 
investment in emerging countries because it reduces potential agency problems, 
opportunistic behavior and the risks associated with high uncertainty that exists in the 
relationship between the VCF and entrepreneurs. The effect of institutional quality is more 
important for fostering investment in technology-based entrepreneurships, which are of 
greater importance for the development objectives of emerging countries. 
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 The literature recommends maintaining a high enrollment rate, developing supportive government policies 
to encourage the migration of scientists and entrepreneurs, a strong protection of property rights, the creation 
of  tax benefits, the development of capital markets, a low rigidity of the labor market and the liberalization of 
pension funds investment (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Belke et al.: 2002, Megginson, 2004). 
The FDI has a positive effect on VCF investments in emerging countries; the FDI shows a 
higher level of significance in promoting investment in high-tech companies and 
institutional quality increases the productivity of FDI by generating greater VCF 
investment. 
 
Government spending has an adverse and significant effect on VCF activity. It can be 
concluded that government size does matter in the dynamics of VC markets in emerging 
countries. Furthermore, institutional quality increases the negative effect of government 
spending on the VCF activity in emerging countries. This last result suggests that the higher 
a country’s institutional quality, the less state intervention it requires to promote VCF 
investment. 
Institutional quality and FDI have higher level of significance in the promotion of 
investment in high-tech companies. The negative effect of government spending on the 
VCF activity maintains a consistently high level of significance in all types of VC 
investments. This situation becomes even more critical for investment in companies that are 
part of the high-tech industry. 
It may be concluded that institutional quality, the FDI and government spending have 
definitive importance as elements for the development of a public policy that fosters VCF 
investment. Furthermore, these instruments are crucial to increase the quality of VCF 
investment in terms of its contribution to the development of emerging countries. Higher 
institutional quality, increased FDI and lower public spending, not only help to boost the 
VCF investment volume, they also support the growth of certain companies who benefit 
from the VCF activity: high-tech companies and the those in the early development stage, 
all of which are also essential to  the economic growth contribution in emerging 
countries. 
The article continues as follows: the second section provides a motivation for research and 
a review of literature on the subject; the third section demonstrates the development of the 
econometric model; the fourth section describes the data and the sources used in developing 
this work; the fifth section considers the results and finally, the conclusions and result 
limitations are presented. 
2. Motivation and literature review 
2.1. Venture Capital investment dynamics and institutional quality 
The activities of economic agents are strongly influenced by existing institutions in the 
environment (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Scott 2001). There is consensus among 
economists about the importance of institutions for economic development. Healthy 
institutions induce individuals to invest and drive economic growth. Recent evidence shows 
that countries with solid institutions have greater growth than those that don’t have them 
(Barro: 1991, Knack and Keefer: 1995, Johnson et al.: 1997). 
The financing of entrepreneurships benefits from the existence of healthy institutions. In 
the VCF – entrepreneur relationship, conflicts arise between the agent (entrepreneur) and 
the principal (VCF) due to the different expectations and interests of each party. The 
existence of asymmetric information (due to the entrepreneur having more information than 
the VCF), the difficulty of monitoring the actual effort that the entrepreneur applies and the 
delegation of property rights that the he/she receives from the VCF, leave open a possibility 
for the appearance of potential moral hazard and adverse selection problems, especially in 
the context of high uncertainty surrounding the young, growing  companies (Amit et al.: 
1998; Elitzur and Gavious: 2003; Gompers: 1995, Kaplan and Stromberg: 2004 , Wright et 
al.: 2005; Zacharakis et al., 2007). 
Formal institutions are important for VCF because they establish the restrictions that are 
necessary to structure the interaction, provide rules that facilitate the exchange, increase the 
trust among economic actors and reduce transaction costs (North: 1990, Williamson 2000). 
Healthy institutions will help reduce the costs and the difficulties faced by VCF to evaluate 
potential projects, ensure an adequate VCF property rights protection and improve both the 
monitoring process and the process of enforcing entrepreneur contractual obligations. 
 
Healthy institutions protect property rights and an adequate protection of property rights 
gives rise to economic incentives that emerge from the appropriation of the investment 
benefits. Satisfactory levels of property rights protection reduce risk perception, encourage 
business creation, stimulate reinvestment in future development projects (Frye and Shleifer: 
1997, Shleifer: 1997, La porta et al. 1999; Demirgüç- Kunt and Vojislav: 1998, Johnson et 
al.: 2002, Kumar et al.: 2002, Claessens and Laeven: 2003) and encourage innovation 
(Parker: 2007). 
In short, a higher VC market dynamic is associated with a strong institution context; 
institutions that increase the trust of investors and promote private sector development. The 
contribution of this paper is in the empirical analysis of the relationship between VCF 
investment and institutional quality in emerging countries. The impact that institutional 
quality has in the investments of VCF in companies in early development stages and who 
are part of the high-tech industry, is clearly shown.  Finally, we determine how the 
institutional quality, FDI and government spending, all interact in generating investment 
commitments in emerging countries. 
2.2. Dynamics of investments by venture capital funds and public expenditure 
The effect public spending has on private investment is an important issue of importance in 
the fiscal policy debates of different nations. The studies follow three main lines: 
 The neoclassical view argues that a high government spending can generate a budget 
deficit, forcing to finance a portion of this spending with debt and promotes increased 
interest rates, which in turn, discourages private investment (Beck, 1993; Heijdra and 
Ligthard, 1997, Voss, 2002; Amirkhakhali et al., 2003; Ganelli, 2003). This “crowding 
out” effect is based on the concept that resources are scarce and are consumed with use. 
Therefore, no matter how any state activity is financed, it always involves an equivalent 
reduction of alternative uses of these resources in private hands. Thus, by acting as a 
substitute, government spending discourages private investment. 
 
 A second line of argument is associated with the Keynesian Acceleration Theory, which 
states that an increase in government spending leads to an increase in income, which 
induces private agents to increase investment to the extent that a higher level of income 
has a positive effect on investor expectations (Aschauer, 1989; Baldacci et al., 2004). 
By acting as a complement, government spending encourages private investment, 
however it is noted that not all the government spending categories produce the same 
effect on private investment. 
 
 The third point of view on the effect government spending has on private investment is 
the "Equivalence" or "rational expectations" Theorem. It is expected that an increase in 
the government budget deficit is accompanied by an increase in taxes or debt, making 
government budget deficits irrelevant in financial decisions. Thus, private agents don’t 
change their consumption or saving expectations and consequently, there’s no effect on 
interest rates or on private investment (Barro: 1978.1989; Kormendi: 1983; Darrat and 
Suliman: 1991, Ghatak and Ghatak: 1996 ). 
 
Some empirical studies try to address the theoretical controversies raised. The results are 
not conclusive  the final entries of such studies point in different directions. For example 
Aschauer (1985), Monadjemi (1993), and Akkina and Celebi (2002) support the 
substitution hypothesis while Ehrenburg (1993), Karras (1994), and Ehrenburg and Wohar 
(1995) are in favor of the complementarity hypothesis. The same happens with studies for 
other countries. For example, Monadjemi (1996) and Looney (1995) say that there is no 
significant evidence to support complementarity or displacement. Laopodis (2001), 
Atukeren (2005), and Erden and Holcombe (2005) support the substitution hypothesis in 
some countries and complementarity in others. 
 
Finally there are some scholars who state that government spending discourages 
entrepreneurial activity and reduces the creation of investment opportunities for the VCF. 
For example, Henrekson (2005) demonstrated in the case of Sweden, that a country that 
provides high levels of welfare, public employment and alternative sources of income, 
causes a negative effect on entrepreneurial behavior. Similarly, Koellinger and Minniti 
(2009) provide evidence empirical data from 16 developed countries in which it is shown 
that generous unemployment benefits are negatively related to the creation of ventures. 
There remains a need to clarify the relationship between government spending and VCF 
activity in emerging countries: Is there a substitute or complementary effect between 
government spending and VCF investment? 
2.3. Dynamics of investments by venture capital funds and FDI 
A free market economy is characterized by few restrictions to the free flow of capital 
investments. Different agents are allowed to move their resources to and from various 
activities, both internally and abroad. This aspect is of great importance for the 
development of the VC industry in several ways. 
 Foreign capital is a potential contributor to VC investments (Salehizadeh: 2005), in the 
emerging and developed countries, funding sources are required to fill the capital gap 
necessary to finance innovative ideas and this way, foreign investors searching higher 
returns, may be willing to take more risks (White and Fan: 2006). The studies made by 
of Alfaro et al. (2009), Alfaro and Charlton (2008) found that entrepreneurial activity is 
promoted by international financial integration in industries in which there is greater 
reliance on external funding. 
 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is related to technological transfer levels, which 
encourages domestic investment (Borensztein et al.: 1998, Mody and Murshid, 2005). 
 
 The foreign presence stimulates entry of domestic firms within the same industry 
(horizontal spillovers) and in related industries up and down the same production chain 
(vertical spillovers) (Acs et al.: 2009, Görg and Strobl: 2002; Ayyagari et al.: 2010). 
 
 In emerging countries, where the capital market is not well developed, the Trade Sales 
figure (sales of a young, starting company to a larger company, known as strategic 
buyer) is an alternative exit mechanism of VCF and many of these strategic buyers use 
foreign investment for acquisitions (Jeng and Wells 2000). 
All this indicates a positive impact of investment freedom and FDI on VCF investment. 
However, there are other theoretical (Grossman 1984) and empirical (Barbosa and Eiríz: 
2009, De Backer and Sleuwaegen: 2003 ) positions, indicating the FDI could generate an 
outlet for domestic entrepreneurs through the selection of products and labor markets. 
Other studies mention that the positive effect of FDI on productivity is very small since the 
benefits are entirely captured by the companies with foreign ownership participation 
(Aitken and Harrison 1999; Konings: 2001). 
From the literature review, it can be concluded that most studies conducted to establish the 
relationship between FDI, institutional quality, government spending and VCF activity, 
focus on developed countries and the research on the topic in emerging countries is still 
very limited. Although there’s consensus in the literature in regards to how institutional 
quality favors investment, there is no information on the types and significance of the 
relationship between FDI, government spending and VC activity. 
3. Models 
The panel data technique for the period of time between 1996 and 2010 is used to assess the 
impact of institutional quality, FDI and government spending on VCF investment in 
emerging countries.  
The Wald test results (Baltagi, 2001) shows significance in the temporary effects for some 
specific years; dummy variables are used in those periods. The result of the Hausman 
specification test indicates random effects and the Breusch and Pagan test (Lagrange 
Multiplier to test random effects) confirms the choice. The model is presented in equation 
(1) and (2) 
ittititititiit yY   '4321    (1) 
 ii           (2) 
Where itY is a measure of company creation in country i during the year t. it , it , it  and 
it  are the variables associated with institutional quality, FDI, government spending and 
the control variables for each country in each year, respectively. t  is a dummy vector per 
year, which has a dimension of T X 1. Equation 2 allows us to control each country’s 
"individual" character, i  is a random variable with a mean value of  and a random 
deviation i . 
The result of the Wooldridge test (2002) indicates no serial correlation. The modified Wald 
test indicates heteroskedasticity. Finally the Pasaran CD test (Hoechle, 2007) indicates 
contemporaneous correlation. Following Beck and Katz (1995) estimates are made by 
PCSE (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) to solve the problems of contemporaneous 
correlation and heteroskedasticity.  Dicotomic variables are introduced to include the 
significance detected in the temporary effects. Having a appropiate period of time in the 
sample (15 years) allows the use of the correction through PCSE models (Beck, 2001). 
 
To mitigate potential endogeneity between FDI and institutional, a model was built to see 
the significance of institutional quality in t-1 when FDI is in t. Although the coefficient is 
positive, is not significant for the countries and time of the sample, therefore you cannot 
choose the solution involving the use of residuals. However, to the extent that intuition tells 
us that higher institutional quality may encourage an increase in FDI, time differences of 
the variables are used and the relationship between FDI in t-2 and institutional quality in t-1 
on VCF investment in t is analyzed.  
4. Justification of variables, measures chosen and empirical implications 
4.1. Dependent variables 
Three different measures are used to determine the level of investment activity of VCF in a 
country in a given year. The first one is the logarithm of the total number of VC 
investments scaled by the active population in the country (Gompers et al., 1998; Da Rin et 
al., 2006, Li and Zahra, 2011). The second measure is the logarithm of the amount of 
investment per capita, based on the economically active population (Salehizadeh, 2005, 
Armour and Cumming, 2006; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006, Li and Zahra, 2011). The 
third measure is the logarithm of the average amount of investment. Emerging countries 
were chosen according to the Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange: FTSE 
index
2
 classification. 
Annex 1 describes the countries included in the sample, the amount and the average 
number of investments made during the study period (from 1996 to 2010). The data is 
obtained from individual VCF investments registered in the Thomson One's Private Equity 
/ Venture Capital database. Alternative measures are used to validate the robustness of the 
relationships since the database omits the amounts of investment of some agreements. 
Subsequently, investments are classified by two criteria: development stage and type of 
activity carried out by the company where the investment is made. For the first criterion, 
the Thomson One database classifies investments in the following categories: seed, start-up, 
expansion, replacement capital and buyouts. VC investment is defined as the sum of the 
first four categories and VC investments in companies in early stages of development are 
the sum of the first two categories. For the second criterion, VC investments in companies 
belonging to the high-tech sector are defined as the sum of investments in the following 
sectors: communications, computing and related biotechnology and related electronics, 
medicine and related. 
This classification allows us to structure four additional dependent variables: the first two 
are the logarithm of the total number of VC investments in high-tech and early stage 
companies scaled by the country’s active population and climbing; the next two are the 
logarithm of the amount invested in high-tech and early stage companies per capita, based 
on the economically active population. These last four allow us to examine the relationship 
between the explanatory variables and these specific types of VC investments, which are 
the most relevant to the development of emerging countries. 
 
4.2. Independent variables: institutional quality, foreign direct investment and 
government spending 
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 The definition of this method of the Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange, FTSE Index was 
consulted in the following webpage:  http://www.ftse.com/Indices/Country_Classification/index.jsp 
Institutional quality is measured with the latest version of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al.: 2010). These indicators are available for 212 countries 
and are used in several previous studies (Wernick et al.; 2009 Dollar and Kraay: 2002; 
Asterly and Levine 2003; Faccio: 2006, Gupta et al.: 2002, Demirguc-Kunt et al .: 2004, Li 
and Zhara: 2011). 
The bivariate correlations between WGI indicators show values between 0.40 and 0.89. To 
establish whether there is dependence on a common dimension, an analysis of the main 
components is made (Ledesma and Valero-Mora 2007). The analysis reveals that a single 
component includes the 77.05% of the variance of the six indicators. After analyzing the 
relationship with the dependent variables, the results in the relationship is very similar to 
that obtained by the simple average of the six institutional quality dimensions. 
A new variable named (Inst_Qual) is created; this measures institutional quality and is the 
average of the six dimensions for each country in a given year. Other researchers also use 
averages to explore the effect of institutional quality on VC and other phenomena (Li and 
Zhara: 2011; Wennekers et al.: 2005; Van Stel et al.: 2007; McMullen et al.: 2008). 
The next explanatory variable is the FDI, which is measured as the net flow of foreign 
investment in the balance of payments, divided by gross domestic product (GDP). The data 
is extracted from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. Finally, 
government spending is measured with government’s final consumption, meaning all 
government expenditures for the purchase of goods and services, including wages. It also 
includes most of the national defense and security expenditures, but excludes military 
spending which is part of the government capital formation. This information is also 
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database and is expressed 
as a percentage of the gross domestic product. 
As stated in the theoretical review, there are different views on the significance and 
direction of the relationship between FDI, government spending and the dependent 
variables. Furthermore, this type of empirical work doesn’t exist for emerging countries; for 
this reason, a specific hypothesis is not proposed in this regard. 
4.3. Control Variables 
 Five control variables are includes (Appendix 2).  
Market Capitalization, many authors mention a positive relationship between start-ups and 
VC activity level (Black and Gleason, 1998; Megginson, 2004, Gompers, 1995, Gompers et 
al. 2008). The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has a positive relationship on FCR activity 
(Li and Zahra: 2011; Salehizadeh: 2005, Gompers et al.: 1998, Jeng and Wells 2000). 
There is a direct correlation between start-ups and VC activity level (Romain and van 
Pottelsberghe: 2004, Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006) because of this we include the 
freedom to start a business as another control variable. The number of scientific and 
engineering articles published in the previous year by researchers who are resident in the 
country. Scientific discoveries and technological opportunities can foster innovation and 
investment in the FCR tends to focus on companies in early stages of development that are 
looking to take advantage of such opportunities for innovation (Kortum and Lerner, 2000: 
Gompers et al.: 1998). 
The amount of goods traded in the economy is another factor associated with the 
stimulation of VC markets. Since this factor affects the development of local industry and 
hence the VCF investment opportunities, it will also have an effect on the investment 
activity of these funds (Bartlett and Ghoshal: 1999, Sobel et al.: 2007). A positive 
relationship between international trade and VCF investment is expected. 
4.4. Description of the data 
Annex 1 shows that all the countries, with the exception of Qatar and Oman, have VC 
investments in companies that are in early stages of development. These two countries, as 
well as Bahrain and Kuwait, have no VC investments in high technology companies in the 
suggested time period (some considerations about the possibility of underreporting in the 
database are made later in this paper). 
Close to one third of VC investment in emerging countries takes place in companies that in 
the early stages of development (31.28% of agreements and 23.5% of the amounts 
invested). The share of investment in high-tech companies is higher, 63.8% of agreements 
and 45.32% of VC investment in emerging countries during the defined time period, takes 
place in companies in this category. 
Annex 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of all the variables, the data shows 
a level of variability that suggests exploring the time dimension of the observations and 
analyzing the control of the specific factors associated with each country. 
Finally, Annex 2 describes the definitions and sources of all variables used in the models. 
5. Analysis of results 
5.1. Relationship between the Investment of FCR, Institutional Quality, Foreign 
direct investment and government spending in emerging 
Table 1 establishes the relationship between the dynamics of the VC industry activity, 
institutional quality, the FDI and government spending in emerging countries. The first 
model uses the logarithm of the total number of VC investments scaled by the country’s 
labor force; the second is the logarithm of the investment per capita, based on the 
economically active population; and the third and last model, the logarithm of the average 
amount of investment. 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
The variable measuring institutional quality is significant at 1% and positive in all cases, 
the significance allows us to conclude that institutional quality has great explanatory power 
of the differences in the VC market dynamics in emerging countries; higher levels of 
quality institutions have a positive effect on the VC activity. The results were confirmed 
using other institutional quality rates (Gwartney et al., 2011, Krause, 2010). 
Government Expenditure has a negative and significant relationship (1%, 1% and 10% 
respectively) with VC investment in the three models for emerging countries. Further 
analysis was conducted to contrast institutional quality, a measure of the free market and 
government spending. Between 1999 and 2009, individual dimensions World Wide 
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al.: 2010) show that in most emerging countries 
(65.12%), higher government spending coincides with lower levels of institutional quality. 
Low institutional quality is a sign of a weak government control spending and 
consequently, of the existence of conditions under which political motives unrelated to the 
well being of the population could be dominating government activity, which discourages 
VC activity. 
By contrasting the free market rate, taken from The Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) 
Heritage Foundation (Beach and Kane 2007), with the government expenditure, the vast 
majority of emerging countries (62.8% for 1999 and 60.5% in 2009) show that increased 
government spending appears with lower levels of market freedom. This evidence supports 
the hypothesis that increased government spending reduces the space for private agents to 
operate. Additional tests are performed later in the paper in order to contrast these findings. 
The FDI shows a positive and significant relationship at 5% with the VC investment in the 
three models; this supports the thesis that the FDI supports VC activity in emerging 
countries. There is abundant evidence favoring this result; annex 4 shows the 10 most 
dynamic emerging countries in the last four years (China, Brazil, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Mexico, Russia, South Korea, India, Singapore and Nigeria). By analyzing the full 
participation of foreign VC funds in each of these countries, we find that the contribution of 
foreign capital in these countries during the last four years ranges from 40% to 50%. 
It is known that FDI is related to technology transfer levels that drive domestic investment, 
the creation of new firms seeking VC funds and the possibility of VCF outflows through 
the figure of Trade Sales (sales of a young, starting company to a larger company, known 
as strategic buyer). Offshore location index of A.T. Kearney
3
, shows that out of the fifty 
most attractive countries for the year 2011, thirty-one are among the emerging countries 
analyzed in this work; the first fifteen in the A.T. Kearney list concide with the most 
dynamic in the VC market for the past five years, according to information from the 
Thomson one private equity / Venture Capital database. 
The following refers to the behavior of some control variables used in the models described 
in Table 1. Market Capitalization is not significant in any of the models; as mentioned 
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 A.T. Kearney, Op. Cit., consultaded on Julio 17, 2011 in the following webpage: 
http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/offshoring-opportunities-amid-economic-turbulence-the-
at-kearney-global-services-location-index-gsli-2011.html  
above, a characteristic of emerging countries is that their financial markets are small and 
underdeveloped. VCF may be aware of this condition when they decide to invest in 
emerging markets, and therefore use alternative mechanisms such selling of companies or 
structuring leveraged buyouts in order to return the property to the entrepreneurs and 
achieve both liquidity and the materialization of profits. 
The freedom to start a business and the number of scientific and engineering articles 
published, show a positive and significant relationship with the number and amounts of 
investments in emerging FCR. Finally, a positive and significant relationship is also present 
between the variable measuring the volume of international trade and VCF investment 
activity for emerging countries. 
5.2. Relationship between institutional quality, direct foreign investment, 
government spending and investment in companies FCR in early stages of 
development and high technology located in emerging 
Table 2 shows four models that describe relationship between the dynamics of the VCF 
activity in high-tech companies and those in early stages of development, and the 
explanatory variables and control variables. Two models are used in each case to verify the 
robustness of these relationships; initially the number of agreements is used as the 
dependent variable in model 4, while in model 5 this variable is the amount of VC 
investment made in companies in early stage of development in emerging countries.  
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The increase in public expenditure has a negative effect on the FCR dynamics, while the 
ease of creating companies and the increase in the volume of imports and exports have the 
opposite effect. Institutional quality and FDI consistently show a positive result in the two 
models but alternate the degree of significance; institutional quality is significant when the 
number of agreements is used as dependent variable, while the FDI is significant when this 
variable is represented by the amount invested. 
The VC activity analysis in high-tech companies in emerging countries is considered in 
models 6 and 7 of Table 2. The dependent variables are different in each model; in Model 
6, it’s the number of agreements, while in model 7 it’s the level of investment in this type 
of enterprise. The increase in government spending negatively affects VC activity in high-
tech companies, while the ease of creating a company, institutional quality, the FDI and the 
increase in the volume of imports and exports, all have a positive effect. 
The results mentioned in the preceding paragraphs have a great significance for emerging 
countries. When considering investing in high-tech companies and those in early stages of 
development, it becomes clear how public policy decisions can strengthen the creation of, 
not only larger but also more effective, VC markets. Those who design public policies in 
emerging countries must not only seek to ensure the increase of the volume of VC activity, 
but also that this growth supports the types of businesses that depend and benefit most from 
the FCR activity, which are precisely the ones in early stage of development and in the high 
technology sector.  
5.3. Productivity of FDI in promoting FCR investment in emerging 
In equation 8 found on Table 3, the 43 countries included in the study are divided into 
quartiles based on institutional quality. The first independent variable "int_qual" measures 
institutional quality; it’s clear that it has a direct and significant relationship with the 
dependent variable, which in this case is the total amount invested by the VCF. The next 
independent variable "fdi * int_qual (upper quartile)" multiplies the FDI by one if the 
institutional quality of the country is in the top quartile, otherwise it’s multiplied by zero; 
the third independent variable "fdi * int_qual (quartiles 2 and 3) " does the same for 
countries with an institutional quality on the second and third quartile; the fourth 
independent variable" fdi * int_qual (lower quartile)" repeats the process mentioned above 
for the countries whose institutional quality is located in the bottom quartile. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
In equation 8 all explanatory control variables share behavior similar to those in previous 
models, the main difference of this regression is that it only the coefficient associated with 
the FDI whose institutional quality is located in the upper quartile. The conclusion is that 
the significance of the FDI coefficient depends on institutional quality, meaning that the 
positive impact of FDI on promoting VCF activity is more productive in emerging 
countries with higher levels of institutional quality. 
To confirm the robustness of the result obtained in equation 8, equation 9 divides the 43 
emerging countries into two groups and the process previously mentioned is repeated for 
both of these groups. As in the previous case, all control explanatory and control variables 
and maintain a proper behavior and the second independent variable "* int_qual fdi (upper 
half) "that multiplies the FDI by one if the country’s institutional quality is in the upper half 
or by zero otherwise, shows a significant coefficient with a magnitude that exceeds several 
times the coefficient of the third variable "fdi * int_qual (lower half)" which does the same 
for countries whose institutional quality is in the lower half of the sample. 
It should also be noted that the coefficient associated with the countries whose institutional 
quality is in the lower half, loses significance. Again, it demonstrates that FDI is only 
significant for the development of VC activity in the emerging countries with the highest 
institutional quality, but also that in these countries the FDI productivity to encourage VC 
investment is much higher. 
The previous analysis is repeated for models 10 and 11, using the VC investment in 
companies that are in the early stages of development, as the dependent variable. The 
results are very similar to those found in the last paragraph. In model 10, the coefficient 
associated with FDI when institutional quality is in the bottom quartile loses significance; 
the coefficient of FDI when institutional quality is on the second and third quartile 
maintains significance, but its value is less than the half the FDI coefficient of countries 
whose institutional quality is in the upper quartile. In model 11, one can observe that the 
variable that accounts for the FDI in countries with an institutional quality in the upper half 
remains significant and has a coefficient that is more than seven times the coefficient 
associated with FDI in countries with an institutional quality located in the lower half, 
which loses its significance. 
All this leads to the conclusion that FDI is more productive and meaningful to increase VC 
investment in companies in early stages of development for countries with higher 
institutional quality. The comparison of the FDI coefficient in model 5 against FDI 
coefficients for countries with institutional quality in the upper quartile (model 10) and 
upper half (Model 11) lead us to the same conclusion; in the last two cases the value of the 
coefficients is greater than the first (0.0583 and 0.0516, compared to 0.03877), which also 
means that there is greater productivity of FDI in generating VC investment in companies 
in early stage of development when there is greater institutional quality. 
Finally, FDI productivity is analyzed in models 12 and 13, using VC investment in high-
tech companies as the dependent variable. The results about FDI and institutional quality 
productivity to promote VC investment for these types of firms are more significant. In 
model 12, the coefficients associated with the FDI when institutional quality is in the lower 
quartile and in the quartiles two and three lose significance; the FDI coefficient for 
countries with an institutional quality in the upper quartile remains significant at 1 % and 
has a coefficient with a magnitude that is 7 times higher than the others. Model 13 shows 
that the variable that accounts for the FDI in countries whose institutional quality is in the 
upper half holds significance at 5% and has a coefficient with a value close to twice the 
coefficient associated with FDI in the countries with an institutional quality in the lower 
half, which also loses its significance. 
 
When comparing FDI coefficient in model 6 against the FDI coefficients for countries with 
an institutional quality in the upper quartile (model 12) and upper half (model 13), the 
results show that, for the last two models, the value of the coefficients is much larger than 
the first (0.0663 and 0.0417, compared to 0.0180), this leads us to affirm that there is 
greater FDI productivity in generating VC investment in high-tech companies when there is 
a higher institutional quality to a greater extent than in companies in early stages of 
development 
There is evidence that institutional quality has a decisive and positive effect in the FDI’s 
level of significance and productivity, in this case in the generation of larger and more 
effective VC markets emerging countries. The results suggest that institutional quality is a 
determining factor in for the FDI to serve as a vehicle to enhance the volume and 
effectiveness of the VC industry in emerging countries; this is mainly because it reduced 
the risks and costs of investing and increases the expected investors’ return. 
It may be concluded that institutional quality is vital for the new FDI in order to produce an 
economic, technological and real social development; a development that results in the well 
being of a society , through  the funding of start-ups and high-tech companies. Otherwise, 
the FDI will not be significant for the creation of active VC markets in the host country. 
5.4. Productivity of Public Spending in promoting FCR investment in emerging 
 
In Table 4, models 14 to 19 repeat the process that was undertaken to find the productivity 
of the FDI but in this case we delve into the government spending behavior in the VC 
dynamics with higher levels of institutional quality. In models 14 and 15, the dependent 
variable is the total amount of VC investment; in models 16 and 17 the dependent variable 
is the VC investment in companies that are in early stages of development; and in models 
18 and 19, the dependent variable is the investment in high-tech companies. 
As seen in all the models that appear in Table 4, the explanatory and control variables 
maintain a similar behavior to the one shown in the previous model. However, in this case, 
it’s demonstrated that increases in government expenditure have a greater adverse effect on 
the quality and quantity of VC activity in countries with higher institutional quality. An 
analysis of the values of the coefficients indicates that for the six models in Table 4, the 
coefficients associated to public expenditure are negative but the absolute value increases 
as institutional quality improves. 
This leads to the conclusion that the higher the institutional quality, the bigger adverse 
effect an increased government spending will have on VC investment dynamics. Given the 
significance of the coefficients in all the cases, this conclusion is valid when the total 
amount of VC investment, the investment in companies in an early development stage, and 
investment in high-tech companies, are used as dependent variables. Nonetheless, the value 
of the coefficients indicates a higher critical nature in the case of investments made in high 
technology companies. 
The results reveal that during the time period defined for the analysis, government spending 
in emerging countries generates a reduction of the space that is meant for the development 
of VC activity. In can be concluded that the adequate conditions in which private VC 
activity thrives in both in quality and quantity, are generated when there’s high institutional 
quality. Thus, in these cases, government spending causes greater displacement. By 
increasing the government size, there will be a reduction on VC markets dynamics in 
emerging countries. This reduction is greater in countries with higher institutional quality, 
which is an important consideration for public policy makers. 
6. Limitations of the study and future research 
Even though some robustness tests have been made throughout this work as to identify the 
solidity of the findings, there are still some limitations that can be remedied by future 
research. As way of example, the construction of parsimonious models that combine 
economic and socio-cultural variables to explain the phenomenon of VC dynamics in 
emerging countries remains critical. 
Government spending can also be classified in different categories so as to determine how 
each one behaves in relation to the VC dynamics; it is likely that different items show 
different levels of significance and interaction. 
Another limitation is related to the fact that the models presented here are only considering 
the increase in investment, however the problem of encouraging the VC investment 
dynamics can be addressed with a balance model between supply and demand. To do so, 
the variables that only affect the supply and those who only affect the demand must be 
identified with absolute certainty; thereby avoiding potential endogeneity problems that 
remain despite the controls implemented in this work. 
Another important aspect that must be addressed for emerging countries is related to the 
patterns associated with how VCF get financial resources; it is likely that this analysis also 
yields factors that encourage the VCF activity in these types of economies. The research of 
the factors affecting emerging countries VCF investment decisions may also shed light on 
how to structure policies to promote investing in companies in early stages of development 
and high tech companies. 
Finally, a lot has been said about how exchange rates’ behavior of affects the flow of 
resources among economies. The theoretical approaches state that real exchange rate 
devaluation may result in an FDI income increase since foreign investors can take 
advantage of the relative decline in the value of local assets. Considering that this work 
establishes that there is a direct and significant relationship between FDI, international 
trade volumes and VC market dynamics, it is appropriate to determine how currency 
movements may be a factor affecting the dynamics of the VC activity in emerging 
countries. 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
An ongoing concern of governments in emerging countries is to establish appropriate 
public policies in order to generate the adequate conditions that will allow for the creation 
of quality employment for its residents. However, this is a battle only a few have been able 
to overcome due to the lack of access to funding sources, the failure to generate market 
conditions, regulatory frameworks and socio-cultural conditions required for the emergence 
of new companies. 
One of the main reasons why many of the initiatives undertaken is that you cannot propose 
a development model in which institutions are not present, there’s a great level of 
uncertainty and there’s market imperfections and of information asymmetry between 
economic agents. This paper contributes to the empirical literature on determinants of the 
revitalization of the VC industry in emerging countries through policy recommendations 
related to the development of the institutions and its interrelationship with other market 
variables that influence the VC market. 
The results indicate a strong positive relationship between institutional quality and the 
increase in the volume and quality of VC activity in emerging economies. We conclude that 
institutional quality has great explanatory power of differences in market dynamics in 
emerging CR. 
Government Spending also has a significant but inverse relationship with the increased in 
VCF activity in emerging countries. There’s evidence that allows one to infer that in most 
emerging countries government spending is not directed at investments that attempt to 
increase the productivity of private investment and/or that boost institutional quality. This 
evidence also indicates that a higher government expenditure discourages private 
investment due to the fact that it reduces the space for private agents to operate. 
FDI shows a positive and significant relationship with VCF investment in emerging 
countries. Evidence shows that this result is the product of FDI’s direct contribution to the 
VC investment in emerging countries, but also in line with additional factors: i) When VCF 
want to liquidate their investments, FDI enables the output through the figure of Trade 
Sales (sales of a young, starting company to a larger company, known as strategic buyer); 
ii) FDI encourages the creation of new companies in emerging countries due to product and 
service Offshoring and to the delegation of functions ranked through Outsourcing processes 
performed by companies in developed countries. 
Because public policy makers in emerging countries are interested in VC activity 
supporting the creation of new ventures, especially technology related, since they are 
essential element in the economic growth. This paper identifies how the FDI, institutional 
quality and government spending are related to VCF investment in companies in high tech 
companies and those in early stages of development. The results show the significance of 
FDI, institutional quality and government spending as effective public policy tools for 
strengthening the creation of VC markets which will later invest in these types of 
organizations. 
It also stated that the positive impact the FDI has on the promotion of VCF activity is more 
productive in emerging countries with higher levels of institutional quality and this higher  
productivity remains for VC investment promotion in companies in early development 
stages of and high-tech organizations, although it is more important for these last ones.  
It is demonstrated that in a given level, the FDI has a greater productivity and significance 
in the VC industry in emerging countries with higher institutional quality. Institutional 
quality is crucial for the FDI to help generate larger and more effective VC markets in 
emerging countries. Conversely, the increases in government expenditure have greater 
adverse effect on the quantity and quality of VC activity in countries with higher 
institutional quality. The negative effect of government spending in countries with higher 
institutional quality is more critical when investing in high technology companies. 
In terms of the relationship between VC investment and government spending, the results 
of this study support the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis. For the defined time period and the 
countries studied, the higher institutional quality, the greater negative effect an increased in 
government spending will have on VC activity. The evidence indicates that when 
institutional quality is high, the conditions necessary for private VC activity thrive, both in 
quality and quantity and it requires less intervention of public investment. 
When institutional instability is reduced, it also reduces the market uncertainty and 
therefore the risk of VC investors who are willing to occupy more space in the markets and, 
in those cases, further intervention is not only not required, it also reduces the space for the 
development of the private market dynamics. Consequently, increasing the size of the 
government reduces the VC market dynamics in emerging countries, but this reduction is 
greater in countries with higher institutional quality. This is another important 
consideration for public policy makers: the higher the institutional quality, the less 
government intervention is required. 
The findings also indicate that the market capitalization is not significant for the increase in 
VC investment in emerging countries, this may be due to the VCF being aware of the lack 
large capital markets in these countries and their use of alternative mechanisms such as the 
sale of firms or structuring leveraged buyouts to return the property to entrepreneurs to 
achieve liquidity and bring profits to fruition.  
The freedom to start a business, the number of scientific and engineering articles published 
and the volume of international trade show a positive and significant relationship with the 
dynamics of VC activity in emerging countries. Public policy makers should be aware that 
the following policies are key to the promotion of VC activity: i) Facilitate the registration 
of new companies. Ii) Strengthen the scientific development and the creation and 
exploitation of innovation opportunities that result in new or improved processes, products 
or services. iii) Take advantage of opportunities that globalization offers through free 
international transaction of goods and services. 
Finally it is recognized that this is only a small contribution to unveil the determinants of 
promotion of entrepreneurship and VC activity in emerging countries. This study is just an 
early step in what promises to be a fruitful line of research in the creation of public policies 
in order to orientate foreign investment, market freedom and institutions towards the 
creation of local VC markets.  
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Annex 1 Average number of agreements and average value of VC investments made from 1996-2010 in millions of dollars in emerging countries 
included in the sample.
 
Country 
Data 
Year
s 
Annual Average - All 
VC Activity  
Activity in companies 
in early stages 
Activity in high tech 
companies 
Country 
Data 
Year
s 
Annual Average - All 
VC Activity  
Activity in companies 
in early stages 
Activity in high tech 
companies 
VC 
Agreemen
ts 
VC 
Investme
nt 
VC 
Agreemen
ts 
VC 
Investme
nt 
VC 
Agreemen
ts 
VC 
Investme
nt 
VC 
Agreemen
ts 
VC 
Investme
nt 
VC 
Agreemen
ts 
VC 
Investme
nt 
VC 
Agreemen
ts 
VC 
Investme
nt 
Argentina 15 10,33 163,17 5 64,83 8,06 120,32 Nigeria 15 5,26 140,20 0,193 6,6 2,06 129,61 
Brazil 15 37,26 668,18 12 191,17 24,86 458,21 Oman 15 0,07 0,73 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 15 2,13 5,99 0,46 0,162 1,4 4,85 Pakistan 15 0,93 0,915 0,47 0,07 0,73 0,57 
Chile 15 2,93 18,78 1,47 6,96 2 11,34 Peru 15 0,43 1,39 0,2 0,67 0 0 
China 15 378,60 7110,09 96,2 1691,31 224,47 2671,57 Philippines 15 1,4 4,6 0,07 0,07 0,73 0,47 
Colombia 15 1,00 12,91 0,07 0,67 0,2 0,068 Poland 15 12,66 34,49 2,67 2,59 5 15,52 
Czech Republic 15 6,4 113,28 1,47 1,9  4,33 94,23 Qatar 15 0,07 1,01 0 0 0 0 
Egypt 15 0,67 4,9 0,07 0,67 0,2 2,29 Romania 15 7,73 30,89 1,93 2,53 2,27 18,87 
Estonia 15 2,33 8,64 0,93 0,94 1,13 2,8 Russia 15 15,47 89,03 3,87 11,38 5,93 37,59 
Hong Kong, 
China 15 27,20 681,62 7,67 55,06 17,4 11,7 Saudi Arabia 15 0,33 0,8 0,07 0,089 0,07 0,089 
Hungary 15 15,33, 58,84 3,27 1,67 8,53 41,26 Singapore 15 40,07 528,2 16,67 358,26 32,45 200,75 
India 15 145,06 1480,99 50,87 224,04 89,67 835,53 Slovakia 15 1,93 4,62 0,33 0,68 0,87 2,01 
Indonesia 15 2,86 35,98 0,67 4,46 1,13 16,6 South Africa 15 8,13 62,56 2 6,89 3,33 87,6 
Korea, South 15 318,86 741,09 117,33 167,57 228,47 387,01 Sri Lanka 15 1,27 3,08 0,67 0,86 0,53 1,18 
Kuwait 15 0,13 1,81 0 0 0,07 1,33 Taiwan, China 15 35,47 220,37 12,2 92,57 32,13 208,48 
Latvia 15 2,07 1,67 0,53 0,14 0,27 0,12 Thailand 15 5,86 14,28 1,53 3,05 1,93 2,79 
Lithuania 15 1,47 16,44 0,33 0,315 0,47 3,61 Turkey 15 1,73 7,94 0,13 0,13 0,67 0,43 
Malaysia 15 10,33 43,68 3,6 oct-94 7,2 21,49 
United Arab 
Emirates 15 2,27 17,26 0,73 1,64 1,47 8,93 
Mauritius 15 0,80 1,46 0,4 0,58 0,13 0,03 Vietnam 15 5 25,18 1,33 2,3 1,87 6,58 
Mexico 15 5,66 52,56 1,6 10,17 2,4 21,58 Bahrain 15 0,13 12,29 0,07 11,47 0 0 
Morocco 15 1,4 4,53 0,27 0,2 0,2 0,9 Bangladesh 15 0,13 0,24 0,13 1,24 0,13 1,24 
                Jordan 15  0,53 0,93 0,27 0,46 0,46 0,86 
Annex 2 Description of the variables used in the models built for the study. 
Variable Descripción Fuente 
Venture 
Capital or 
Capital Risk 
(CRit) 
Total value of investments made by venture 
capital funds  in the country in the year i for 
country j, measured in millions of dollars and 
standarized by the economically active population 
Thomson one private equity/ 
Venture Capital database 
High 
Technology 
(HT_CRit) 
Total value of investments made by venture 
capital funds in the country in the year i for 
country j in companies in the communication 
sector, computer and related, biotechnology, 
electronics and related medical and related; 
measured in millions of dollars and standardized 
by the economically active population 
Thomson one private equity/ 
Venture Capital database 
Early Stages 
(ES_CRit) 
Total value of investments made by venture 
capital funds in the country in the year i for 
country j in companies in early stages of 
development, measured in millions of dollars and 
normalized by the economically active population 
Thomson one private equity/ 
Venture Capital database 
Venture 
Capital 
Investment 
Agreements 
(Dealsit) 
Total investment contracts signed by the venture 
capital funds in the country in the year i for 
country j 
Thomson one private equity/ 
Venture Capital database 
High 
Technology 
Investment 
Agreements 
(HT_Dealsit) 
Total investment contracts signed by the venture 
capital funds in the country in the year i for 
country j in companies in the followings sectors:  
communications, computer and related, 
biotechnology, and related electronics, medicine 
and related. 
Thomson one private equity/ 
Venture Capital database 
Early Stages 
Investment 
Agreements 
(ES_Dealsit) 
Total investment contracts signed by the venture 
capital funds in the country in the year i for 
country j in companies in early stages of 
development, 
Thomson one private equity/ 
Venture Capital database 
Venture 
Capital 
Average 
Investment 
(Prom_CRit) 
Average value of investment by venture capital 
funds in the country in the year i for country j, 
measured in millions of dollars. 
Thomson one private equity/ 
Venture Capital database 
Institutional 
Quality 
(Ins_Qualit-1) 
 
 
Indicates the perception of institutional quality in 
a country and it is the average of the six 
dimensions of "Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI)" of the previous year. 
World Wide Governance 
Indicators 
Daniel Kaufmann, Brookings 
Institution, Aart Kraay, 
World Bank Development 
Economics Research Group, 
Massimo Mastruzzi, World 
Bank Institute.  
http://info.worldbank.org/gov
ernance/wgi/index.asp 
Consulted on February 2 of 
2011. 
Business 
creation 
freedom 
(Bus_Freeit-1) 
It’s a quantitative measure of the ease to start, 
operate, and close a business in the previous year. 
The Heritage fundation, 
index of economic fredoom. 
http://www.heritage.org/inde
x/explore?view=by-region-
country-year  
Consulted on February 9 of 
2011. 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
(GDPit-1) 
Total real gross domestic product of the previous 
year in dollars, multiplied by 10E-06. 
United Nations: UNCTAD, 
UNCTADstat. 
 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/R
eportFolders/reportFolders.as
px 
 
Consulted on February 15 of 
2011. 
Published 
Cientific 
Articles 
(Art_Pubit-1)  
Scientific and engineering articles published in 
the following fields: physics, biology, chemistry, 
mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical 
research, engineering and technology, by authors 
from a country in the previous year. 
National Science Foundation, 
Science and Engineering 
Indicators  
 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
seind10/appendix.htm 
 
Consulted on March 17 of 
2011. 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(FDIit-2) 
Net flow of foreign investment divided by gross 
domestic product of two years ago. 
The World Bank, World 
Development Indicators  
http://search.worldbank.org/d
ata?qterm=foreign+direct+in
vestment&language=EN&for
mat=html  
Consulted on February 16 of 
2011. 
Tradeit-1 Trade of goods as a share of last year’s gross 
domestic product: it is the sum of exports and 
imports divided by the value of gross domestic 
product in current dollars. 
The World Bank, World 
Development Indicators  
http://search.worldbank.org/d
ata?qterm=trade%20in%20go
ods&language=EN&format=
html  
Consulted on February 16 of 
2011. 
Mar_Capit-1 Market capitalization is the share price multiplied 
by the number of issued shares of domestic 
companies listed in the stock market in the 
previous year;  nvestment companies, mutual 
funds or other forms of collective investment are 
not included. 
The World Bank, World 
Development Indicators  
http://data.worldbank.org/ind
icator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD  
Consulted on February 16 of 
2011. 
Gov_Expit-1 Government expenditure in the previous year as a 
percentage of gross domestic product; includes all 
government expenditures for the purchase of 
goods, services and compensation of employees, 
excluding military spending. 
The World Bank, World 
Development Indicators  
http://data.worldbank.org/ind
icator/NE.CON.GOVT.CD  
Consultado en Febrero 16 de 
2011 
 
  
Annex 3 Descriptive statistics for the variable sample used in the models. 
 
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations Type 
Deals 0.4445019 0.7197617 0 4.365648 643 
   
Dependent  
Es_Deals 0.1996466 0.4748617 0 3.595963 643 Dependent  
Ht_Deals 0.2852441 0.6119559 0 4.288716 643 Dependent  
VC 0.931489 1.367958 0 7.455757 599 Dependent  
ES_VC 0.3337071 0.8651638 0 7.383477 627 Dependent  
HT_VC 0.5756618 1.110095 0 6.732348 619 Dependent  
Prom_VC 0.3571682 0.7090796 0 6.162952 599 Dependent  
Ins_qual 0.1362838 0.6324969 -1.404543 1.511143 473 Explanatory   
Fdi 4.089779 5.253924 -2.757439 51.05552 633 Explanatory   
Gov_Exp 14.87011 5.463092 4.36433 33.01189 645 Explanatory   
Trade 95.8632 72.4053 0.9205211 445.9112 639 Control   
Mar_Cap 57.60194 83.25881 0.0198936 1094.965 624 Control   
GDP 0.2232152 0.4197569 0.0040424 4.984426 645 Control   
Art_Pub 2824.728 5715.057 3.3 56805.8 546 Control   
Bus_Free 68.49051   13.72661  39.8  100  632 Control   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
              
Dynamics of the Venture Capital activity industry, Institutional Quality, Foreign Investment and 
Government Spending in Emerging Countries 
Independent  
Variables  
Dependent Variable  
Number of Agreements Amount Invested Average Investment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
int_qual 0,4463 (0.0674)*** 0,5282 (0.1298)*** 0,2694 (0.0767)*** 
fdi 0,0152 (0.0072)** 0,0518 (0.0255)** 0,0411 (0.0195)** 
govexp -0,0332 (0.0026)*** -0,0533 (0.0098)*** -0,0109 (0.0066)* 
gdp -0,0696 (0.1033) 0,6673 (0.2862)** 0,1097 (0.1316) 
art_pub 3,39E-05 
(5.59E-
06)*** 4,33E-05 (1.82E-5)** -9,79E-06 (6.48E-06) 
mar_cap -0,0007 (0.0005) 0,0006 (0.0010) 0,0002 (0.0007)  
bus_free 0,0083 (0.00318)*** 0,0152 (0.0056)*** 0,0013 (0.0047) 
trade 0,0026 (0.0004)*** 0,0036 (0.0014)*** 0,0015 (0.0011) 
constant -0,1405 (0.2068) -0,4172 (0.3229) 0,1305 (0.2952)  
Dummies time Si Si No 
R² 0,5112   0,4493   0,3017   
Observations 365   340   340   
Number of 
countries 42   42   42   
Test Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value 
Wald chi²(11) 2,34E+06 0,0000 698,18 0,0000 128,74 0,0000 
Hausman 21,34 0,0033 3,59 0,8254 7,47 38,15 
Breusch-Pagan     15,02 0,0001 0,56 45,47 
Pesaran CSD 3,186 0,0014         
Modified Wald het. 2,30E+05 0,0000 8380,82 0,0000 1,60E+05 0,0000 
LM Serial Corr 0,023 0,8808 2,352 0,1336 4,422 0,0423 
Model PCSE  PCSE PCSE c(ar1) 
 
 
  
Anexo 4 VC foreign investment in the 10 fastest growing countries in the CR market in recent years. 
Year  Country China India 
Corea 
del Sur 
Hong 
Kong 
Brazil Singapur Taiwan Rusia Nigeria Mexico Total 
2007 
Total VC Investment  18.446,5     2.171,2      488,3   3.290,2      660,8      122,2      11,1     32,0        32,0      15,0   25.269,12  
VC Foreign Funds    7.308,8     1.305,3        58,8   3.290,2      650,2      114,0      11,1       9,6          9,6      15,0   12.772,48  
Percentage  39,6% 60,1% 12,0% 100,0% 98,4% 93,3% 100,0% 29,9% 0,0% 100,0% 50,5% 
2008 
Total VC Investment  21.106,9     4.009,1      176,2      141,5   1.418,0      174,4      12,8   409,0        20,0      12,0   27.479,86  
VC Foreign Funds  10.978,8     3.022,7        91,1      117,5   1.248,0      148,4      12,8   310,7        20,0        6,0   15.956,00  
Percentage  52,0% 75,4% 51,7% 83,1% 88,0% 85,1% 100,0% 76,0% 100,0% 50,0% 58,1% 
2009 
Total VC Investment    8.923,6     1.427,6      163,5      159,6        84,0      123,9    352,1     26,8   1.750,0      13,0   13.024,13  
VC Foreign Funds    2.337,6        851,5        72,4      148,6        81,8      111,3    352,1     13,7   1.750,0      10,0     5.728,99  
Percentage  26,2% 59,6% 44,3% 93,1% 97,4% 89,8% 100,0% 51,0% 100,0% 76,9% 44,0% 
2010 
Total VC Investment  12.339,6     2.543,6      386,2      147,6   1.006,1      138,0      76,5   280,6        10,0    162,9   17.091,03  
VC Foreign Funds    4.168,7     1.571,3      185,4      147,6      481,4      131,0      65,9   115,9        10,0    141,5     7.018,64  
Percentage  33,8% 61,8% 48,0% 100,0% 47,9% 94,9% 86,1% 41,3% 100,0% 86,9% 41,1% 
Total 
Total VC Investment  60.816,6   10.151,5   1.214,2   3.738,9   3.168,8      558,5    452,5   748,4   1.812,0    202,9   82.864,14  
VC Foreign Funds  24.793,9     6.750,8      407,6   3.703,9   2.461,4      504,7    441,9   449,8   1.789,6    172,5   41.476,11  
Percentage  40,8% 66,5% 33,6% 99,1% 77,7% 90,4% 97,7% 60,1% 98,8% 85,0% 50,1% 
 
Table 10 shows the most dynamic emerging countries in the last four years (China, Brazil, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, 
India, Singapore and Nigeria). Each row shows the total VC investment, VC investment by foreign funds and the percentage of the first over the 
second. The analysis was repeated for all the years from 2007 to 2010. The last row is the total of each country for each year. The last column adds 
the total of each row for each year in all countries. One can observe that the contribution of foreign capital to the VC investment in the last four 
years in these countries has been fluctuating between 40% and 50%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Dynamics of the Venture Capital activity industry in high tech companies and those in early development stages, Institutional Quality, Foreign 
Investment and Government Spending in Emerging Countries 
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables  
Number of agreements in 
companies in early stages 
Amount invested in 
companies in early stages 
Number of agreements in 
high tech companies 
Amount invested in high 
tech companies 
  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
int_qual 0,1953 (0.0342)*** 0,1118178 (0.0826) 0,3506 (0.0601)*** 0,4328 (0.1013)*** 
fdi 0,0066 (0.0049) 0,0387737 (0.0128)*** 0,0180 (0.0058)*** 0,0358 (0.0176)** 
govexp -0,0227 (0.0018)*** -0,0389522 (0.0071)*** -0,0322 (0.0032)*** -0,0577 (0.0081)*** 
gdp -0,0746 (0.0550) 0,3632474 (0.2044)* 0,2474 (0.1328)* 0,5580 (0.2579)** 
art_pub 1,93E-05 (3.03E-07)*** 0,0000221 (1.39E-05) 3,56E-05 (8.98E06)*** 3,69E-05 (1.54E-05)** 
mar_cap -0,0001 (0.0003) 0,0018443 (6.04E-04)*** -0,0001 (0.0003) 0,0001 (0.0007) 
bus_free 0,0074 (0.0022)*** 0,0156831 (0.0050)*** 0,0066 (0.00245)*** 0,0189 (0.0040)*** 
trade 0,0016 (0.0003)*** 0,0019942 (0.0009)** 0,0028 (0.0005)*** 0,0024 (0.0009)*** 
constant -0,2253 (0.1622) -0,7889917 (0.3657)** -0,3369 (0.1768)* -0,6600 (0.2726)** 
Dummies time Si Si Si Si 
R² 0,4071   0,3738   0,6275   0,4488   
Observations 365   355   365   352   
Number of countries 42   42   42   42   
Test Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value 
Wald chi²(11)              761,60  0,0000 785,69 0,0000 644,84 644,84 592,33 0,0000 
Hausman                25,58  0,0006 6,04 0,5355 49,66 0,0000 15,82 0,0708 
Breusch-Pagan     4,91 0,0266     106,52 0,0000 
Pesaran CSD                6,607  0,0000 8,642 0,0000 6,790 0,0000 6,501 0,0000 
Modified Wald het. 2,79E+04 0,0000 7,50E+05 0,0000 4124,90 0,0000 9124,08 0,0000 
LM Serial Corr              0,3320  0,5674 2,270 0,1398 3,039 0,0888 3,237 0,0793 
Model PCSE PCSE PCSE c(ar1) PCSE c(ar1) 
 
Table 3 
FDI and Institutional Quality productivity on the Dynamics of the Venture Capital industry activity in Emerging Countries  
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables  
Total Amount Intvested  
Amount invested in companies in early 
development stages  
Amount invested in high tech companies 
  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
int_qual 0,5312 (0.1526)*** 0,4331 (0.1532)*** 0,0558 (0.1202) 0,0392 (0.0980) 0,3301 (0.1133)*** 0,3669 (0.10192)*** 
fdi*int_qual (mitad superior)     0,0699 (0.0294)**     0,0516 (0.0162)***     0,0417 (0.0181)** 
fdi*int_qual (mitad inferior)     0,0122 (0.0263)     0,0066 (0.0129)     0,0221 (0.0195) 
fdi*int_qual (cuartil superior) 0,0525 (0.0307)*     0,0583 (0.0245)**     0,0663 (0.0248)***     
fdi*int_qual (cuartiles 2 y 3) 0,0503 (0.0319)     0,0269 (0.0122)**     0,0096 (0.0177)     
fdi*int_qual (cuartil inferior) 0,0556 (0.0389)     0,0222 (0.0219)     0,0246 (0.0348)     
govexp -0,0531 (0.0103)*** -0,0534 (0.0102)*** -0,0353 (0.0064)*** -0,0374 (0.0075)*** -0,0516 (0.0093)*** -0,0572 (0.0077)*** 
gdp 0,6686 (0.2814)** 0,8309 (0.2994)*** 0,3583 (0.1983)*** 0,3911 (0.2043)* 0,4581 (0.2428)* 0,4358 (0.2469)* 
art_pub 4,29E-05 (1.79E-05)** 3,58E-05 (19.1E-05)*** 2,09E-05 (1.33E-05) 2,05E-05 (1.41E-05) 3,86E-05 (1.46E-05)*** 4,27E-05 (1.47E-05)** 
mar_cap 0,0007 (0.0010) 0,0012 (0.0011) 0,0021 (0.0006)*** 0,0021 (0.0007)*** 0,0008 (0.0007) 0,0004 (0.0006) 
bus_free 0,0152 (0.0058)*** 0,0142 (0.0056)** 0,0144 (0.0047)*** 0,0148 (0.0050)* 0,0150 (0.00421)*** 0,0172 (0.0036)*** 
trade 0,0036 (0.0013)*** 0,0032 (0.0014)** 0,0016 (0.0008)** 0,0016 (0.0009)*** 0,0020 (0.0007)*** 0,0025 (0.0007)*** 
constant -0,4153 (0.3247) -0,4124 (0.3016) -0,7328 (0.3418) -0,7303 (0.3632)** -0,4565 (0.2671)* -0,5477 (0.2507)** 
Dummies time si si si si si si 
R² 0,4493   0,4626   0,3757   0,3784   0,4923   0,4821   
Observations 340   340   355   355   352   352   
Number of countries 42   42   42   42   42   42   
Test Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value 
Wald chi²(11) 903,22 0,0000 868,93 0,0000 132,24 0,0000 104,39 0,0000 995,33 0,0000 846,76 0,0000 
Hausman 12,18 0,5918 6,98 0,8591 7,84 0,7274 8,79 0,552 11,31 0,5030 13,11 0,2178 
Breusch-Pagan 19,37 0,0000 20,03 0,0000 4,17 0,0411 5,86 0,0155 64,46 0,0000 105,39 0,0000 
Modified Wald het. 7065,75 0,0000 8852,77 0,0000 96267,12 0,0000 54098,32 0,0000 7846,84 0,0000 8770,99 0,0000 
Pesaran CSD         6,611 0,0000 7,157 0,0000 5,642 0,0000 6,416 0,0000 
LM Serial Corr 3,097 0,8670 1,810 0,1867 2,052 0,1598 2,398 0,1294 3,436 0,071 3,231 0,0796 
Model PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE 
 Table 4 
Productivity of state intervention and Institutional Quality in the Dynamics of the Venture Capital industry activity in Emerging Countries  
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables  
Total amount invested  
Amount invested in companies in early 
development stages 
Amount invested in high tech companies 
  (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
int_qual 0,6029 (0.1752)*** 0,5128 (0.1521)*** 0,1817 (0.1334) 0,1509 (0.1085) 0,5396 (0.1311)*** 0,5235 (0.1238)*** 
Fdi 0,0497 (0.0253)** 0,0515 (0.0248)** 0,0373 (0.0132)*** 0,0367 (0.0129)*** 0,0339 (0.0159)** 0,0308 (0.0163)* 
govexp*int_qual (mitad superior)     -0,0532 (0.0115)***     -0,0404 (0.0088)***     -0,0641 (0.0078)*** 
govexp*int_qual (mitad inferior)     -0,0545 (0.0092)***     -0,0357 (0.0063)***     -0,0518 (0.0072)*** 
govexp*int_qual (cuartil superior) -0,0559 (0.0217)***     -0,0432 (0.0104)***     -0,0677 (0.0174)***     
govexp*int_qual (cuartiles 2 y 3) -0,0547 (0.0097)***     -0,0390 (0.0075)***     -0,0594 (0.0078)***     
govexp*int_qual (cuartil inferior) -0,0449 (0.0127)***     -0,0324 (0.0070)***     -0,0478 (0.0091)***     
gdp 0,7221 (0.3028)** 0,6936 (0.2856)** 0,3283 (0.2062) 0,2948 (0.1971) 0,4217 (0.2484)* 0,3632 (0.2481) 
art_pub 3,90E-05 (2.02E-05)* 4,27E-05 (1.83E-05)** 2,22E-05 (1.41E-05) 2,45E-05 (1.39E-05)* 4,14E-05 (1.54E-05)*** 4,48E-05 (1.47E-05)*** 
mar_cap 0,0008 (0.0011) 0,0008 (0.0010) 0,0015 (0.0007)** 0,0016 (0.0006)*** 1,63E-05 (0.0007) 0,0003 (0.0006) 
bus_free 0,0142 (0.0059)** 0,0147 (0.0056)*** 0,0166 (0.0051)*** 0,0165 (0.0049)*** 0,0174 (0.0036)*** 0,0167 (0.0038)*** 
trade 0,0037 (0.0014)*** 0,0038 (0.0014)*** 0,0019 (0.0009)** 0,0020 (0.0009)** 0,0025 (0.0008)*** 0,0027 (0.0008)*** 
constant -0,2499 (0.3392) -0,2780 (0.3409) -0,8146 (0.3711)** -0,8177 (0.3603)** -0,5329 (0.2670)** -0,5261 (0.2694)* 
Dummies Time si si si si si si 
R² 0,4520   0,4512   0,3675   0,3672   0,4836   0,4858   
Observations 340   340   355   355   352   352   
Number of countries 42   42   42   42   42   42   
Test Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value Est. P-value 
Wald chi²(11) 949,9 0,0000 848,39 0,0000 89,85 0,0000 111,42 0,0000 958,31 0,0000 918,11 0,0000 
Hausman 7,81 0,8001 7,26 0,7774 6,61 0,7621 8,63 0,4720 10,53 0,5694 14,67 0,198 
Breusch-Pagan 20,01 0,0000 19,18 0,0000 5,24 0,0220 4,73 0,0296 107,64 0,0000 100,6 0,0000 
Modified Wald het. 6475,47 0,0000 6962,38 0,0000 54368,19 0,0000 53513,7 0,0000 9406,07 0,0000 9749,95 0,0000 
Pesaran CSD         9,495 0,0000 9,132 0,0000 6,615 0,0000 5,931 0,0000 
LM Serial Corr 2,236 0,1433 1,782 0,1901 1,970 0,1682 2,267 0,1400 3,043 0,0886 3,188 0,0816 
Model PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE 
  
 
